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RUMMAGING THROUGH THE 
EMPEROR'S WARDROBE 
Don Herzog* 
POLITICS: A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY. 3 Volumes. 
By Roberto Mangabeira Unger. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 1987. VOLUME 1: SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS 
TASK. Pp. vii, 256. Cloth, $39.50; paper, $12.95. VOLUME 2: FALSE 
NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE 
OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY. Pp. xiii, 653. Cloth, $59.50; paper, 
$18.95. VOLUME 3: PLASTICITY INTO POWER: COMPARATIVE-HIS-
TORICAL STUDIES ON THE INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF Eco-
NOMIC AND MILITARY SUCCESS. Pp. vi, 231. Cloth, $37.50; paper, 
$10.95. 
The publication of Politics is officially a major event. Rumors of its 
impending explosion on the intellectual and political scene have been 
swirling through the academy for some time. Prized typescript copies 
of various chunks of it have been circulating. Thanks in part to Un-
ger's legendary status as shadowy guru of the Critical Legal Studies 
movement and in part to the prestige assured by publication in three 
volumes by Cambridge University Press, Politics isn't just another 
book to read. After all, we have all too many mere books already: we 
are caught in a crisis of overproduction, in a prisoner's dilemma 
brought on by everyone's frantic desires to enlarge her own vita and 
the failure of presses to insist that bulky manuscripts actually have 
something worth saying. Now it's true that Politics is bulky: it weighs 
in at over one thousand pages of text. And regardless of whether it 
has something worth saying, it will be avidly consumed. For again 
this is no ordinary book, and Unger is no ordinary author. Still, I 
want to treat Politics as, well, just another book. Just as Marx 
shouldn't be adored or reviled out of hand, but (like everyone else) 
read with a judicious mixture of sympathy and criticism, so too Unger. 
Not that Unger writes as though his is just another book. He 
writes as though Politics is destined to become a classic of social the-
ory, a natural continuation in the line marked out by Smith, de 
Tocqueville, Marx, Simmel, Weber, and Durkheim. The text is sprin-
kled with jarring comments that make a mockery of mere chronology: 
Unger tells us what economists were doing "[b]y the close of the twen-
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tieth century" (vol. 1, p. 125), and what theory of contract under-
girded legal doctrine "by the end of the twentieth century" (vol. 2, p. 
204). The past tense here is weird; but it's one way, I suppose, to 
make one's work look timeless. The text is sprinkled too with bits of 
shameless self-promotion: Unger never tires of claiming that his argu-
ments are surprising, even astonishing, for instance that "[h]owever 
familiar this conception may seem in the abstract, its historical appli-
cations go beyond belief" (vol. 3, p. 101). 
These affectations aside, Unger's prose style will make actually 
reading these volumes strenuous work even for his disciples. (This is 
not a book for the fainthearted, not a book for a lazy Sunday afternoon 
or a day on the beach. Better to wield it nonchalantly in a smoke-filled 
cafe while sipping cappuccino.) Sometimes the writing is simply 
opaque: I don't know what to make of constructions like "airy, murky 
promises" (vol. 2, p. 465), or "the puns of calculation, mastery, and 
love that run through every aspect of social life" (vol. 2, p. 136). And 
for the life of me I can't figure out why someone would want to refer 
to "the statishness of states" (vol. 3, p. 80), what sounds like a droll 
locution rejected by Donald Barthelme, and then add that that just 
refers to their strength. Some of Unger's distinctions matter, but are 
hard to keep in mind: he distinguishes super-theory, ultra-theory, 
anti-theory, and proto-theory. (Actually, I think ultra-theory and 
anti-theory are the same thing, but I wouldn't bet on it.) Other appar-
ent distinctions are just synonyms, introduced despite Fowler's per-
fectly sensible strictures against elegant variation: so presuppositions, 
forms, contexts, structures, and frameworks refer here to the same 
thing. 
More often, the writing is at once bombastic and florid. Unger 
loves long sentences and disdains punctuation. Combined with his 
often eccentric word choice, that leaves the reader contemplating such 
Orphic formulations as these: 
Theoretical insight and prophetic vision have joined ravenous self-inter-
est and heartless conflict to set the fire that is burning in the world, and 
melting apart the amalgam of faith and superstition, and consuming the 
power of false necessity. [vol. 1, p. 215] 
Or again: 
[T]he Western way of life so coveted by the propaganda of self-fulfill-
ment has gone further than its predecessors in liquefying entrenched 
structures of social division and hierarchy and in creating the institu-
tional and imaginative conditions for a more free-floating experience of 
exchange, attachment, and subjectivity. [vol. 2, p. 544] 
Quite. 
But what's the book about? Politics celebrates the contingency of 
social life. History, Unger assures us, hasn't got a plot or a script; 
there's no sense appealing to alleged causal laws to tell us how things 
are bound to unfold. Unger dwells lovingly for hundreds of pages on 
1436 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1434 
this open secret, and from it draws two implications. First, people 
trying to explain what has happened must show how deeply contin-
gent the outcome was, and resolutely refuse even to insinuate that it 
was necessary. Second, radicals pursuing exotic programs needn't be 
discouraged by those who say their goals are impossible. For whether 
the naysayers are conservatives trying to invest the current regime . 
with an aura of false necessity, or Marxists insisting that only one for-
ward path is possible, they miss how remarkably loose-jointed histori-
cal change is. 
That's it, in a nutshell. If you want to join the army of intellectuals 
who will discuss these volumes without actually slogging through 
them, that's all you really have to know. One might well suspect that 
it doesn't require a thousand-plus pages of fulminations to make those 
two points. That's right; but there is a bit more to be found here. And 
of course there are some intriguing - make that surprising or aston-
ishing - twists and turns to be found as Unger unpacks his insights. 
MANNING THE BARRICADES 
"Imagine, reader, that you were involved in the politics of ... say 
Brazil, around 1985" (vol. 1, p. 67). So Unger ushers the hapless 
reader into an apparently hypothetical example that I take to offer the 
motivation for this gargantuan project. If "you" were involved in Bra-
zil, "you" would have found a regime seesawing "between mock liber-
alism and controlled mobilization" (vol. 1, p. 67), with spates of harsh 
military rule thrown in for good measure. "You" would have found a 
partly unsettled political order, lurching uncertainly from one ugly set 
of policies to another. And "you" would have noticed that the stan-
dard mapping offered by Marxists just didn't fit: it didn't make sense 
of radical commitments among the petty bourgeoisie, or indeed of how 
amorphous class interests seemed to be; nor did it make sense ,of a 
lively struggle over the identity of God. 
"Now imagine, reader, that you threw yourself into the Brazilian 
situation just described. Suppose that you were one of those many 
people who looked on politics as both an insider and an outsider" (vol. 
1, p. 75). If "you" weren't going to be paralyzed, if "you" weren't 
going to fall into familiar political traps that led nowhere, "you" had 
to realize how deeply everything might be up for grabs. But "you" 
would find other leftists staggering around "like men wandering 
around in a daze: their doctrines were dreams" (vol. 1, p. 78). Many 
of them clung to the outmoded slogans of Marxism, what Unger else-
where derides as "the pompous subtleties of a hairsplitting scholasti-
cism" (vol. 2, p. 417). Misled by their own categories, they failed to 
come to terms with their situation, failed too to offer any incisive polit-
ical programs. 
Caught in this position, what did "you" want to do? Unger an-
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swers for "you": "You wanted to write a book to set things straight" 
(vol. 1, p. 79). Imagining all that I might do as a frustrated activist in 
Brazil, I couldn't quite imagine myself doing that. But in fact the ex-
ample isn't hypothetical. As many already know, and as both the 
back covers of these volumes and Unger himself (vol. 1, pp. 227-28) 
remind us, Unger has maintained a role in Brazilian politics. The ex-
ample is so transparently autobiographical that Unger doesn't even 
manage to keep the rhetoric of addressing "you" straight. There I 
was, busily trying to picture myself in this hastily sketched situation, 
when I was jarred to read this: "Try to understand, reader, by an act 
of imaginative empathy, the bitterness a person in such a circumstance 
might feel" (vol. 1, p. 78). 
I wouldn't write a ponderous tome in social theory to deal with my 
dilemmas as a Brazilian activist. (Not that I think ideas are irrelevant 
in politics: quite the contrary. But big fat books are, shall we say, a 
chancy vehicle for advancing them. Let alone big fat books in foreign 
languages.) And maybe "you" wouldn't either. But Unger apparently 
would: I take these volumes to be his response to his political failures. 
The "you" of his example is himself, a point worth insisting on only as 
another clue to the perplexing style of the work. These pages are 
haunted by a solipsistic absorption. Often, as here, Unger is clearly 
writing notes to himself, not a book to an outside audience. At any 
rate there's something fetching about the thought of writing three 
English volumes on social theory "to set things straight" in Brazilian 
politics. Stranger things have happened, I suppose. Lenin consoli-
dated his ascendancy partly by churning out unreadable works in the 
philosophy of science. (History repeats itself, first as tragedy, then as 
farce?) Maybe Brazilian political activists are all fluent in English. Or 
maybe the book has been translated. And maybe - I don't know -
the activists of Brazil are being transformed by reading these volumes 
even as I write. But somehow I doubt it. 
Unger also makes an unmistakable bid to find compatriots in the 
academy. He wants "to enlist the reader's help in the theoretical cam-
paign that this work initiates" (vol. l, p. 9) (rumor has it more 
volumes of Politics are on the way), "to recruit and to help co-workers 
in a common endeavor by sharing with them elements of a study plan" 
(vol. 2, p. 596). These co-workers will share the double commitment 
that Politics advances, and the Brazilian example makes clear. In their 
academic work, they will reveal over and over that things could have 
gone differently; in their political work, they will use that demonstra-
tion to slap their less contingently minded comrades in the face and 
wake them up. A bit disarmingly, Unger accompanies his invitation 
(call to arms?) with an instruction: "When the larger argument falls 
into confusion and obscurity, when I stagger and stumble, help me. 
Refer to the purpose described in this book and revise what I say in 
the light of what I want" (vol. 1, p. 9). So I propose to do here. It's 
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not exactly the sort of assistance Unger probably had in mind. Then 
again, as he'd have to agree, things don't always work out as intended. 
EXPLANATION AND CONTINGENCY 
In a now notorious 1942 article, Carl Hempel argued that explana-
tion in history is no different from explanation in physics. To explain 
something, he urged, is just to subsume it under some causal law. If 
historians are actually explaining anything, they must be doing that, 
or at least offering compressed explanatory sketches that could in prin-
ciple be amplified into such nomological-deductive subsumptions. If 
they're not doing that, he announced, they can't claim to be explaining 
anything. 
This account of explanation has a number of striking features. 
Chief among them, for my purposes here, is this: Explanation and 
prediction, as Hempel knew full well, become mirror images of one 
another. Suppose I'm about to boil some water to make some coffee. 
Then you can predict the water's boiling in this way: set out the rele-
vant causal laws as the major premise of a syllogism, the relevant de-
scription of the pot and its heat source as the minor premise, and 
deduce the prediction as a conclusion. Suppose now that you're asked 
after the event to explain it. Then you do the very same thing. "Ex-
planation" is just the name of nomological-deductive subsumptions 
done after the fact, "prediction" the name of the very same subsump-
tions done before the fact. Both show that the event had to happen, 
given the antecedent conditions and the governing causal laws. 
Quite a few historians found Hempel's argument baftling. Take a 
historical event, say Lyndon Baines Johnson announcing that he 
wouldn't stand for reelection as president. This looks anomalous: 
many of us take for granted that the powers and prestige of the presi-
dency are deeply attractive, and surely many politicians aspire to the 
office; but here's a man who walked away from it, who walked away 
from a race in which he'd have been equipped with the considerable 
advantages of incumbency. But it's not an impenetrable mystery. Af-
ter the fact, many historians would say, we can construct a perfectly 
lucid explanation for Johnson's withdrawal. We can point to the 
"Dump Johnson" movement spearheaded by liberals like Al Lowen-
stein, and increasing popular disaffection with the Vietnam War, and 
the heavy toll that being president in such bitterly heated circum-
stances had taken on LBJ. But contemporaries knew all of that, and 
still many of them were surprised (some overjoyed) when Johnson 
made his announcement. Here, it seems, we have an account which 
does function as an explanation, but couldn't possibly have provided a 
reliable prediction. Here explanation and prediction aren't symmetri-
cal. We want to say that after the fact we can explain why LBJ with-
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drew, but his withdrawing wasn't in any way necessary, so it couldn't 
have been predicted before the fact. 
What shall we make of this explanation? One could be a stem 
positivist, and insist that if it doesn't meet Hempel's standards it's not 
really an explanation at all. A more sensible option would be to artic-
ulate an account of how such explanations work: Hempel gives us no 
reason to surrender our firm intuition that indeed such accounts do 
perfectly good explanatory work. So Jack Hexter did, in a brilliant 
book-length response to Hempel's strictures. Such explanations, he 
urged, tell stories. They exhibit the unfolding events as intelligible re-
sponses to what has already happened. Given a rich enough descrip-
tion of the context and the actors, we understand what otherwise 
would be an anomaly or a mystery. 
Take another example. A man accosts someone in a subway sta-
tion and asks his opinion of D.H. Lawrence's unpublished correspon-
dence. The other man is baffied, a bit uncomfortable, and edges away 
uneasily, muttering dark imprecations about the perils oflife in the big 
city. Onlookers will share his puzzlement. Even if they know full well 
who Lawrence is, they will wonder why anyone would ask a stranger 
such a question. So the event cries for explanation. We can't explain 
it by subsuming it under some causal law; I take it there are no causal 
laws that provide the necessary and sufficient conditions under which 
people will ask weird questions in subway stations. We explain it by 
embedding it in a narrative. So, for instance, it might be that the ques-
tioner is a KGB agent with a stupidly chosen contact line; or that 
(spacy academic that he is) he mistakes the other man for an English 
professor he just saw· at a conference; and so on. . 
If Hexter's account is right - I think it is - we have explanations 
that aren't just "postdictions," or predictions that happen to be gener-
ated after the event. And we have explanations that are wholly com-
patible with contingency. Johnson chose to withdraw; here's why; still 
he could have done something else. A Hempelian might try to thrust 
into the heartland of the enemy: Okay, she might ask, but why did 
Johnson choose to withdraw? If he could have done something else -
if he could have gotten out of Vietnam, or gritted his teeth and forged 
ahead regardless of his critics - why didn't he? But the parry is easy. 
We needn't undergird the story with the "real" explanation, the causal 
theory that underlay it all along. Instead we can just tell more stories, 
stories to which withdrawing from Vietnam or defying his critics 
would be increasingly unlikely conclusions. Not impossible, not ruled 
out causally, just unlikely. 
The Hempelian might urge that the story works by providing rea-
sons for Johnson's action, and go on to argue that reasons are just one 
kind of cause. There's a knotty debate there I happily leave aside, 
since Hexter and other writers have offered another, devastatingly 
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conclusive point about narratives, one hanging on what philosophers 
of science call "collocations." 
Here's a story that has nothing to do with reasons. In a grade-B 
horror movie, a mad scientist builds a machine to blow up the fair 
community of Freeville, New York. The machine is just a collection 
of three devices, wired together in series. The first device is triggered 
if and only if the temperature is sixty-five degrees. The second is trig-
gered if and only if the current noise level is thirty-five decibels. And 
the third is triggered if and only if it picks up the strains of the Rolling 
Stones' "Sympathy for the Devil." Since the machine is in series, it 
will blow up Freeville if, and only if, all three events happen at once. 
Our mad scientist leaves it in the high school teachers' lounge, 
chuckles fiendishly, and heads off into the swamp to catch his dinner. 
In the movie, let's imagine, Freeville blows up at midnight during 
the high school prom. Why? Well, the temperature was hovering at 
sixty-five degrees; at the same time, the machine picked up just thirty-
five muffled decibels from the band playing in the gym downstairs; and 
-you guessed it - they were playing "Sympathy for the Devil." The 
causal laws of physics, together with a correct description of the wir-
ing of this machine, dictate that whenever those three things happen at 
once this machine will trigger an explosion. But of course there is no 
causal law that dictates when or whether they will happen at once. 
It's just an unlucky coincidence that all three do take place together 
the night of the senior prom. The deterministic workings of the 
machine provide the essential backdrop to the explanation. But the 
machine may have been in place for weeks, months, even years, with-
out ever going off. The explanation for why it goes off when it does is 
quirkily contingent. It just so happens that on this mild spring eve-
ning this band happened to play this song at this volume level. In 
another universe, one with causal laws identical to ours but a slightly 
different arrangement of objects, the machine never would have gone 
off. 
These themes are already quite familiar in the literature on expla-
nation. That's why I called the contingency of social affairs an open 
secret. But it's not just the contingency of social affairs: our imaginary 
machine explodes at a contingent time, and evolutionary biology and 
geology, historical sciences both, are chock full of explanations that 
leave room for the possibility that things could have gone differently. 
In social theory, Weber long ago insisted on objective possibilities, and 
worked out an account of how they arise. 
But Unger wants very much to be saying something new here. So 
he insists that "[i]t is not enough to invoke the idea of a mode of narra-
tive explanation that accounts for events merely by placing them in a 
rich context of sequence and by appealing to vague criteria of plausible 
connection" (vol. 1, p. 191). The pejoratives aside, why isn't it 
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enough? And what should we say when we find Unger himself offer-
ing just these sorts of explanations? Like Charles Sabel, Michael Pi-
ore, and other recent writers, Unger is enchanted by what he calls 
petty commodity production. True, he agrees, it crumbled in the face 
of large-scale industrialism. But it didn't have to. We could have had 
a different kind of market, one preventing a few players from holding 
all wealth but promoting innovation and free trade nonetheless; we 
could have had a different kind of democracy, one not hampered as 
the state once was from explicit restructurings of the economy. So the 
triumph of Fordism, the decline of skilled artisans working in small 
teams, was contingent. But this is nothing but (the outline of) a nar-
rative, as Unger himself notes: "The preceding narrative accounts for 
the defeat of the petty bourgeois alternative without appealing to deep-
structure explanations of why petty commodity production was 
doomed to failure from the start" (vol. 2, p. 227). 
Unger's text holds out a bold promise: no one yet, he insists end-
lessly, has fully worked out the implications of social contingency; 
and, from his summary dismissal, one would think he had something 
up his sleeve far removed from "mere" narration. But the promise 
isn't redeemed; what we get are IOUs for the same old stuff. Not that 
there's anything wrong with that: good stories are hard to come by 
and a pleasure to find. But Unger shouldn't pretend he's offering 
something apocalyptically new - or even mildly different. He's not, 
as far as I can tell. Antinecessitarian explanation, while an imposing 
mouthful, is in place already. Despite the shrill rhetoric of a handful 
of positivists, it's what we actually do, day after day, the "we" refer-
ring to us ordinary academics, the mere mortals whom Unger seems to 
loathe. Despite the rodomontade with which Unger surrounds his po-
sition, it looks in the end very much like business as usual. 
RADICAL POLITICS? 
If Unger's descriptive project ends up endorsing a banal common-
place, his prescriptive agenda seems breathtakingly radical. For Un-
ger, politics is the art of the impossible. Less pithily but more 
accurately, it's the art of transforming our sense of what's possible, of 
loosening the constraints that bind us so that we can plunge headlong 
into what is now unimaginable territory. Unger bewails "the tedious, 
degrading rhythm of history - with its long lulls of collective narco-
lepsy punctuated by violent revolutionary seizures" (vol. 2, p. 1; tem-
porarily narcoleptic readers who miss the point will find it reiterated 
not quite verbatim at vol. 2, p. 6). 
What makes history so relentlessly repetitive? Why do we go on 
day after day playing out the same prefabricated roles? Because we 
are caught in the very social settings that we constructed. We forget 
that they're our constructions, that we could have constructed them 
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differently, that we could move to change them. They take on all the 
unassailable appearance of the laws of nature, and we don't acknowl-
edge their "makeshift, pasted-together, and alterable character" (vol. 
2, p. 8). These themes too are old hat in social theory. Marx, Simmel, 
Weber, Durkheim: all insist that, whatever we may think, our social 
institutions aren't necessary. Indeed one wonders who didn't know 
this: Fustel de Coulanges did; Hume and Smith did; Vico did; Plato 
did . . . . Regardless, once we awaken to Unger's antinaturalistic in-
sight into contingency, we will be free to entertain all kinds of political 
programs we don't take seriously now. 
Not that we need to master the intricate windings of his discussion 
to get the point. It is, he thinks, built into our everyday experience 
already. There are always glimpses of alternative possibilities, mo-
ments of incipient disorder that we could seize on and use as levers to 
transform the world. We don't, though; narcoleptic ourselves, I sup-
pose, like the leftist comrades whom Unger hates, we drift by them 
unconsciously. 
So we can turn the world upside down. Together we can hurl our-
selves into the exuberant business of social transformation. There are 
glimmerings here of a particular political agenda, a direction Unger 
would like us to move in. It is, he says, a "superliberalism" more than 
a continuation of civic humanism: Unger has no truck with recent 
arguments for a community of people sharing fundamental ends. Such 
a communitarian polity, he asserts, would lead to a "paralysis of the 
power to innovate," worse yet to "self-conscious austerity" (vol. 2, p. 
587). 
At this point in his argument (I use the term loosely), Unger re-
peatedly makes a characteristic error. We have to escape our binding 
contexts, he urges, to become "the originals we all know ourselves to 
be" instead of mere "placeholders in a system of group contrasts" (vol. 
2, p. 564). Or again: insofar as he transcends his current contexts, 
"[t]he citizen becomes more and more an individual rather than a pup-
pet of collective categories of class, community, or gender, or a player 
in a historical drama he can neither understand nor escape" (vol. 2, p. 
471). Or again: "We can construct not just new and different social 
worlds but social worlds that more fully embody and respect the crea-
tive power whose suppression or containment all societies and cultures 
seem to require" (vol. 2, p. 1). 
Social institutions of all sorts here are constraining, never enabling. 
Unger's "superliberalism" is really romanticism, no more. In dog-
gedly maintaining that "we are an infinite caught within the finite" 
(vol. 2, p. 12), Unger misses how deeply we are constituted by the very 
social routines he detests. It's not, surely, that we begin life as enor-
mously rich and multifaceted individuals, and then the walls come 
closing in. No doubt we begin with the potential to do many different 
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things. But that's just to say that who we will become depends on our 
social experiences. Those experiences, though, don't choke off the 
wonderfully rich persons we were already on the verge of becoming. 
They make us the persons we are: without them we'd be nothing. 
There are of course ways in which the weight of history is a horri-
ble burden. There's nothing delightful about growing up in a world 
that already has nuclear arms, dioxin, terrorists, starvation, and all the 
rest. But history also bequeaths us plenty of lovely possibilities. 
When I go home today, I will play Bach and Strayhorn on my piano; 
and when I come back to work tomorrow I will in fact earn a living by 
teaching undergraduates American political thought and thinking 
about consent theory. I am born into a world where Bach and 
Strayhorn have already lived, where pianos are for sale in a market-
place, where there are universities that hire political theorists. But 
those facts aren't lamentable constraints: they make possible activities 
that wouldn't be conceivable without them. And insofar as I am a 
musician fond of baroque and jazz, or a political theorist, my identity 
isn't just something that escaped getting squashed by society; it 
wouldn't have been possible without society. 
Romantics are no different: their identities, their characteristic as-
pirations, are also made possible by a particular history and a particu-
lar set of social roles. That "[i]n their better and saner moments men 
and women have always wanted to live as the originals they all feel 
themselves to be" (vol. 1, p. 214) is of course false. The suspicion that 
one's social roles are phony, that one's reality lies apart from them, 
has a history: it is, for instance, in the hands of Rousseau a savage 
critique of the stylized interactions of court society. I know of no evi-
dence that men and women before the rise of romanticism entertained 
any such suspicions. (Did Socrates? or Augustine? or Aquinas? Do 
Kwakiutl Indians? or Nepalese farmers? or Palestinian refugees? Or 
are all these people simply insane?) And I'd argue that romanticism 
depends as well on a differentiated society, where one occupies differ-
ent roles. For only then can one distance oneself from any particular 
role; and so only then can one imagine distancing oneself from all of 
them at once. 
Authors too, just for example, rely on social institutions. Picture a 
man sitting on the top floor of Radcliffe's Hilles Library, piles of yel-
low legal paper stacked neatly in front of him, writing at breakneck 
pace. That man easily makes a number of assumptions about the so-
cial world he inhabits: that libraries will go on holding resources for 
writing books, that others will respect his property rights in the pre-
cious unique copy of his manuscript and not seize it to train puppies, 
that he will still be a tenured professor when he wakes up the next 
morning, that academic publishers will still be in the business of pub-
lishing esoteric tomes, and on and on. Those continuities shouldn't be 
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derided as ruts that constrain the infinite force of his personality. 
They make possible his writing a book, something no one could do in a 
world of perpetual flux. True, Unger sometimes tacks on a sober af-
terthought: "[W]e can never perform the act of defiance often enough 
or relentlessly enough to save ourselves from having to settle down in 
a particular social order" (vol. 1, p. 13). But this locution makes it 
sound like a regrettable fact. It's not that, alas!, we have to settle 
down. We should want to: a life composed of nothing but radical 
turmoil couldn't conceivably be choiceworthy. 
Unger is so ecstatic about smashing whatever we inherit that he 
doesn't bother with some rudimentary distinctions. Often his text sug-
gests that it doesn't matter if some institution is good or not, or better 
than what seem to be the available alternatives. Regardless, it's a par-
alyzing routine that turns us into puppets, and so we should smash it. 
(Why doesn't smashing itself become a rut, a despicable routine that 
we engage in mechanically, so betraying our authenticity?) And we 
always know that we can smash it. Even while social institutions are 
lulling us into narcolepsy, Unger reminds us, they're also murmuring 
that radical change is possible. At key moments of conflict and uncer-
tainty, we realize that things could be up for grabs. 
That's right, but it hardly follows that putting them up for grabs 
would be a good thing. Take our imaginary author again. He knows 
that formally the business of academic publishing is a brutal mer-
itocracy of texts, where the fame of the author is wholly irrelevant. 
But he also knows, or should know, that fame may make a world of 
difference. University press reviewers are anonymous, but they know 
whose work they're reviewing. And editors may tip their hands, co-
vertly or not so covertly telling the reviewers what verdict they'd like 
them to reach. So the manuscript that our famous author submits will 
be published by a top-notch university press with all sorts of hoopla. 
The very same manuscript, submitted by an anonymous assistant pro-
fessor at Washtenaw Community College, wouldn't have a chance. 
We can always glimpse the corrosive force of celebrity on the routine; 
we can always sense that presses want to make money, and may be 
willing to publish an overblown and incoherent book if they think that 
the fame of the author will make it pay off. But what follows? Surely 
not that we ought to demolish the claims of meritocracy, and instead 
focus explicitly on celebrity. Wrenching ourselves free of the compul-
sive publishing routines that we've taken for granted would shake 
things up. And it might reward the fantasies of some personalities. 
But it would be a stupid thing to do. 
Again, Unger does seem bent on change for its own sake. He even 
proposes - I see no reason to doubt that he's in earnest - that we 
create a new branch of the state whose job is to unsettle all other social 
institutions, even the other branches of government. Lest this sound 
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loony or unattractive, Unger hastens to assure the reader that this sys-
tem needs control, though not the "banal system of checks and bal-
ances" (vol. 2, p. 454). He would empower extrapolitical institutions 
to fight back, and arm individuals with an apparently immutable set of 
immunity rights (vol. 2, pp. 524-30). These rights are so important 
that he proposes each one should be legally demarcated by a "bright 
line" (vol. 2, p. 530) - a drily amusing touch, coming from the Unger 
who has long intimated deeply skeptical sentiments about law. 
Unger might have reflected profitably on the contradiction be-
tween his intoxicated celebration of a world of radical contingency, 
where everything may be up for grabs, and his sensible instinct to put 
limits on that change. Then again, if sometimes the text signals cau-
tion about its own thrust, sometimes Unger goes out of his way to flirt 
with danger, to show just how radical and daring he can be. Here is 
intellectual and political life at the edge of the cliff: "Jusf as the quest 
for empowerment through plasticity may enable us to live out more 
fully our context-transcending identity, so, too, it may subject us to a 
despotism less messy or violent but more thoroughgoing than any yet 
known" (vol. 2, p. 592). Or again: "The radical project," he says 
proudly, 
is morally perilous. . . . At worst, the practical and imaginative strife it 
unleashes overshadows the attempt to promote and to reconcile the dif-
ferent facets of human empowerment. At best, many loyalties embedded 
in established contexts of social life must be betrayed, and many passion-
ately held views about the requirements of happiness must be over-
turned. [vol. 1, p. 214] 
Even so, he adds, "The radical project is not enough" (vol. 1, p. 214). 
One wonders what further dangers need to be added. 
Daredevilry - motorcycle stunts, skydiving, and the like - has its 
place in life. But trying to model politics on it, recommending a 
"look-ma-no-hands" approach to our basic social institutions, is zany. 
Unger's enthusiasm invites what he would no doubt dismiss as tire-
some and pedestrian reminders about the value of civil liberties, that 
banal system of checks and balances, and the other familiar baggage of 
liberal democracy. No doubt such practices can be reformed, and no 
doubt some of them should be. But exhilaration about change for the 
hell of it is exotic at best. Maybe Unger's activist friends in Brazil 
disappointed him because of their misbegotten belief in false necessity. 
But maybe they decided that his political crusades were flighty and 
irresponsible. Worse decisions have been made. 
THE IMPERATIVES OF PLASTICITY? 
I want to return to the double commitment of Politics. As a matter 
of fact, political outcomes are deeply contingent; and we ought to cele-
brate that contingency, to transform society endlessly. Unger im-
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plores us to recognize the appeal of "plasticity," of social relations that 
don't bind us quite so relentlessly into monotonous routines. He 
doesn't like the familiar distinction between fact and value, is and 
ought. So he takes some pains to insist that the two strands of his 
double commitment are intimately intertwined. I am no great de-
fender of the is/ought gap: I think that indeed normative statements 
can't be deduced from purely factual ones, but I also think that it 
doesn't matter. Still, Unger's own stumbling about the issue leads him 
to a wonderfully absurd exposition. To close, I want to consider that 
exposition. 
Once we agree that it's all up for grabs, Unger says, we have two 
choices. We can side with the ultra-theorists - he names Dewey (I) 
and Foucault (vol. 1, p. 237), but I think he really has in mind Kelman 
and Tushnet - and spend our time puncturing any claims about ne-
cessity, revealing over and over how contingent particular outcomes 
were. Or we can engage in super-theory. That is, we can affirm our 
"extravagant theoretical ambitions" (vol. 1, p. 150) and strive to de-
velop sweeping generalizations that don't deny contingency. Unger 
wants to go the route of super-theory. (Surprised?) 
So emerge some transhistorical generalizations. "Each model of 
human association that helps constitute a plan of civilized life includes 
three elements: a group of ideals, slogans, and dogmas; a set of prac-
tices that, better or worse, stand for these ideals in fact; and an area of 
social experience to which the application of these principles remains 
confined" (vol. 2, p. 104). "Particular arrangements cannot easily coa-
lesce within an institutional complex nor can these arrangements coex-
ist over time if they embody very different degrees of the breaking 
open of society to politics" (vol. 2, p. 126; on why, see vol. 2, p. 166). 
"The enacted version of human association always has two aspects, 
which correspond to the two faces of human sociability" (vol. 2, p. 
144), passionate attachment and instrumental exchange. "In all but 
stateless societies the disturbance of the relation between governmen-
tal power, on one side, and the system of social roles and ranks, on the 
other, is an indispensable part of context-transforming conflict" (vol. 
2, p. 266). Most implausibly, even if limited to agrarian bureaucratic 
societies: "The ambition of every bureaucrat is to become a landhold-
ing aristocrat in his own right" (vol. 3, p. 14). 
One might well wonder how all these claims square with a picture 
of social change as forever surprising us with new possibilities. Even if 
some of these claims are relatively formal or abstract, how can Unger 
be confident they'll continue to hold true in the future? But leave that 
aside. For one strand of Unger's super-theory offers a perfectly famil-
iar way of bridging the fact/value gap: wishful thinking. One exam-
ple: "The more entrenched ["formative contexts"] are ... the steeper, 
more rigid, and more influential the social divisions and hierarchies to 
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which they give rise" (vol: 2, p. 61). A guarantee in the face of radical 
contingency: the more plasticity we attain, the more charmingly egali-
tarian our lives will be. Never fear the prospect that we will discover 
new contexts, at once extremely plastic and wildly inegalitarian. Un-
ger takes considerable pains to distinguish his own brand of super-
theory from theories that deny radical contingency. At moments like 
this, though, the distinction becomes vanishingly fine. 
Nor is this (nearly) the only moment. Unger's text is peppered 
with other examples of wishful thinking. "Nothing succeeds like plas-
ticity," (vol. 1, p. 198) proclaims our bold revolutionary; "no society 
can resist the imperative of plasticity without risking failure in the race 
for economic advantage and military security" (vol. l, p. 214); 
"worldly success requires self-transformation" (vol. 3, p. 101). A soci-
ety stuck in a rut is a sitting duck, just waiting for some boldly innova-
tive economic or military competitor to overtake it. 
How does Unger know this is true? Presumably from reflecting on 
historical evidence, which he apparently has mastered on a colossal 
scale. Politics casually parades what looks like an extraordinary 
knowledge of world history, what might put even Weber to shame. 
On just two pages (vol. 3, pp. 22-23), Unger tosses off comments about 
Chinese statecraft, the imperial unification of 221 B.C., the Ottoman 
palace system, European absolutism, pomestye land and votchina ten-
ure from Ivan the Terrible to Peter the Great, early Yi policy in Ko-
rea, and the kongsin. "Remember," he mutters parenthetically - this 
academic use of that verb is beautifully snobbish - "Remember the 
Byzantine ktemata stratiotika, the Ottomon timariots, the Mughal 
zamindars, and the Aztec military life-tenants" (vol. 3, p. 22). On we 
go, hurtling through world history at a dizzying pace, through 
Romanus Lecapenus and Basil II, China's Toba Wei Empire and the 
early T'ang dynasty, the late Roman Empire, the Islamic Abbasid re-
gime in the Near East and northern Africa. 
I confess that I have absolutely zero knowledge of any of these 
historical episodes. Nor am I proud of this ignorance. But I confess 
too that I don't trust Unger's assessment of them. For I do know 
something about Tudor and Stuart England. And just a few pages 
before this imposing display of erudition, Unger refers as readily to 
"late sixteenth century England (. . . the time of Thomas Cromwell 
and Somerset)" (vol. 3, p. 19). How's that? Thomas Cromwell was 
put to death in 1540, Somerset in 1552. Late sixteenth century? Later 
on, Unger says, "[I]n the course of the English Civil War, the New 
Model Army almost got out of hand and jeopardized the country's 
basic institutions" (vol. 3, p. 175). Almost? The New Model refused 
to be disbanded, and was responsible for eliminating the House of 
Lords, purging the membership of the Commons, and having King 
Charles put on trial and executed. Isn't that jeopardy enough? 
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What are we to make of these errors? Some will be inclined to 
forgive Unger for what they will view as minor empirical mistakes. 
They will be enamored of his bold vision, of a sweeping panorama 
which enchants even if it's not quite accurate. Others, with a more 
sober regard for getting the facts straight, will seize on these mistakes 
as howlers. They will suspect that Unger's dazzling erudition is a 
sham. Sometimes Unger seems perversely bent on promoting the de-
lights of being cavalier about facts. "A little curiosity," he comments 
on his own research, "goes a long way" (vol. 3, p. 96). Maybe too long 
away. 
Appearances aside, the imperatives of plasticity don't depend on 
Unger's reading of the historical evidence. They are nothing but a 
plausible a priori argument summoned up by the imagery of ruts and 
flexibility. But we shouldn't take that imagery for reality. (Does supe-
rior plasticity explain the enduring success of the Roman Catholic 
Church, surely one of the great institutional success stories of history? 
Doesn't the church's strength stem in part from its resolutely sticking 
to its core doctrines and roles?) Here's the nub of the wishful thinking 
that ties fact and value together: The endless and unpredictable 
churning of radical social change is possible, and it's good for individ-
uals (since it allows them to express new facets of their inexhaustible 
personalities), and it's imperative for societies (else they'll be over-
taken by lean and hungry competitors). Politics unwittingly endorses 
a secular theodicy: a Darwinian competition will go on rewarding the 
more plastic, punishing those caught in ruts, who happen to be nasty 
inegalitarians anyway. All's well that must end well. History turns 
out to have a plot after all, and Unger knows what's coming next. He 
is the social theorist as Merlin, less wise than magical, peering into a 
crystal ball. No fraud, no con man out to gull the rubes, he actually 
believes in his own vaunted powers: his is a marvelously innocent 
pose. No positivist, no "deep-structure theorist," he nonetheless confi-
dently predicts the future. 
From these dizzying heights, though, our brave super-theorist oc-
casionally remembers his own strictures about the contingency of all 
things, his emphatic rejection of all "deep-structure" theories that pre-
tend to offer such predictions. He realizes that his argument seems 
shot full of puerile contradictions. Then he retreats. He says, a bit 
lamely, that he only wants to endorse the claim that there is "a possi-
ble progression, which presents the radical project with its chance" 
(vol. 2, p. 281), that there is a ''possibility of a certain precarious, inde-
terminate, reversible but nevertheless cumulative and momentous 
change in the character of our formative contexts as well as in their 
content" (vol. 2, p. 304; emphasis in original). Unger's ambivalence, 
his shifting uneasily between a vision of guaranteed success and one of 
endless contingency, shows up beautifully in this claim: "[T]he re-
peated practice of institutional dissociation and recombination is not a 
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random walk. It has - at least, it has often had - a direction" (vol. 
3, p. 206). The inserted concession is devastating. 
All Unger is entitled to, of course, is the more modest, contingent 
claim. The open secret that haunts these volumes, that history has no 
plot, haunts his own project to demonstrate the coming victory of 
plasticity. In the end, all he can say is that things might get better. So 
they might. But we knew that, surely, before opening these turgid 
pages. Save your money. 
